You can be held liable for a cyclist’s injuries, even if you don’t actually hit them.

In British Columbia new designated bicycle lanes appear every day. These lanes are designed to provide bicyclist with an exclusive place on the road, free from motor vehicles. As these lanes are relatively new, injuries caused by motor vehicles entering bicycle lanes and colliding with bicycles are unfortunately relatively common. For example, this happens often when motor vehicles enter bicycle lanes when making turns or pulling into or out of parking spaces.

In this case, a truck pulled close to a cyclist. The cyclist put his hand onto the truck, to balance himself, as he thought the truck would strike his vehicle. The truck then drove forward without actually striking the bicycle. However, as the cyclist’s hand was on the truck, he did fall over when the truck accelerated forwards. The plaintiff, who was in his late 70s, was awarded approximately $200,000 in damages, mostly to compensate him for pain and suffering and future care costs.

This case illustrates the need to be extra cautious when around designated bicycle lanes. Cyclists have little protection, when compared to the occupants of motor vehicles, and are more easily injured. Cyclists, under the law, are allowed to act reasonably in response to sudden changes in circumstances, without being liable for collisions. For example it might not be unreasonable for a cyclist to swerve to avoid a collision with a vehicle, even if that evasive action resulted in the cyclist falling over.

Why you need to seek treatment for your injuries in personal injury cases.

Seeking both proper and ongoing treatment for injuries in personal injury cases is extremely important for a multitude of reasons. Not only will proper treatment help you recover from your injuries, but it will significantly improve the strength of your case.

In this recent Supreme Court of British Columbia case, the judge commented multiple times on the plaintiff’s lack of ongoing medical treatment:

At paragraph 21:

[21] It was pointed out to the plaintiff on cross-examination that, since the end of 2013, the only treatment she has received for what she described during her evidence-in chief as “significant” and “constant” pain was six massage therapy sessions between January 8, 2015 and September 3, 2015. The plaintiff insisted that she was “using other forms of treatment” for her other symptoms such as the exercise regime she had learned from some kinesiology sessions she attended in 2013.

[22] It was also pointed out to the plaintiff during her cross-examination that her doctor had recommended she seek counselling for her driving anxiety. She agreed that it was unreasonable for her not to have done so.

The plaintiff had also attended only 4 treatments with their family doctor for treatment related to their motor vehicle collision injuries. The plaintiff had seen their family doctor more regularly, but had not mentioned her injuries from the collision during these visits. In his discussion, the judge further stated:

[89] On cross-examination, the plaintiff became less than steadfast about her pain symptoms and had difficulty explaining why most of the clinical records made no mention of many of them. The best she could do was to say “I don’t remember” or “I was focused on other things”. Moreover, it became clear from the evidence of both Ms. Kilmer and Ms. Lahti, which I accept, that the plaintiff had exaggerated her ongoing pain symptoms and inability to work at Gulfstream.

[90] As this Court has previously noted, the absence of reference to a symptom in a doctor’s notes of a particular visit cannot be the sole basis for any inference about the existence or non-existence of that symptom. However, where, as here, a plaintiff’s description of her symptoms is clearly inconsistent with her failure to seek medical attention and is consistent with improvement in her condition, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference as to her credibility: Edmondson v. Payer, 2011 BCSC 118, at paras. 36–37.

As stated, while the absence of medical treatment cannot be the “sole” basis for an inference about the existence or non-existence of a symptom, the court can consider these absences when drawing inferences about credibility. In English, a judge can use the presence or absence of medical treatment as a factor when deciding whether or not they believe you.

How much can future cost of care awards involving concussions be worth?

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury (also referred to as a concussion in this case) after being injured in a motor vehicle collision with a bus. At issue was whether the plaintiff had suffered a loss of consciousness. There were conflicting statements in the clinical notes and other statements made by the plaintiff from around the time of the collision – including those given to ICBC. The judge ultimately decided that the plaintiff had indeed suffered a loss of consciousness and that a loss of consciousness was not necessary to prove that a mild traumatic brain injury had occurred. Medical experts had stated ” that a traumatically induced psychological disruption of brain function (a traumatic brain injury) can be manifested by “at least one” of any period of loss of consciousness, of loss of memory for events immediately before or after the Collision, and of alteration in mental state at the time of the Collision.

The plaintiff was awarded $766,203.00 to compensate him for costs associated with future care related to his ongoing neurodegenerative deterioration and early dementia. The plaintiff in this case had no prior neurological or dementia issues, yet was continuing to see decreased cognitive ability following the collision. The courts ruled that this deterioration was likely to proceed, and the plaintiff’s cost of care costs would grow as this deterioration continued.

This case illustrates the importance of hiring effective counsel, and how personal injury awards rely on findings of fact by a judge. Small changes in these findings of facts can result in massive swings in an award. For example, if the judge had found the plaintiff’s cognitive injuries were likely to have stabilized, the award of damages to the plaintiff would have likely have been much smaller.

Making Waves: How much are concussion cases involving entrepreneurs worth?

In this recent Supreme Court of British Columbia case, a successful owner of a brand devoted to the production of surf boards and clothing was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The injured party was riding a motorcycle when they were struck by an oncoming car making a left turn. This was a significant crash that involved the oncoming vehicle deploying both of its front airbags. The plaintiff was thrown violently to the ground and remembers waking up in the intensive care unit of the hospital. He was left with long lasting injuries including a concussion and a knee injury.

Prior to this accident, the plaintiff had, per the judge’s own words, “achieved more by the age of 32 than many people achieve in an entire lifetime”. His line of clothing and surf boards had, despite some ups and downs, grown greatly.

The courts were left with the difficult task of assessing the plaintiff’s income losses, both past and future. As in many cases involving business owners, the plaintiff’s income fluctuated dramatically, and his future income was even more uncertain, as recent financial restructuring resulted in dramatically increased possibilities of both failure and success.

The plaintiff, following his accident, was left partially impaired. He was able to continue working in his business, but did so with less confidence and vigor. He had to delegate tasks to others. The judge, however, concluded that the plaintiff still managed to demonstrate above average business skill and great creativity. In other words, the plaintiff was found to have a “partial impairment”. The judge ultimately decided that the best way to access the plaintiff’s losses was under the “replacement approach”, as the plaintiff had already hired employees to perform some of his tasks. The plaintiff was given an award for the likely costs of replacement labour for tasks he would have performed himself but for the accident.

The plaintiff was ultimately awarded a total award of approximately $1,000,000.00. This case demonstrates that even though the assessment of wage losses can be difficult, the courts will continue to do their best to assess those losses.

Who is at fault for a rear end collision?

Generally, the driver of the rear vehicle is at fault. Motorists have a duty to look ahead and keep a proper look out. Additionally, Section 162 of the Motor Vehicle Act has been interpreted to mean that drivers have a duty to leave significant space in front of them to allow them to stop safely without hitting the vehicle in front:

Following too closely

162(1) A driver of a vehicle must not cause or permit the vehicle to follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the amount and nature of traffic on and the condition of the highway.

(2) The driver of a commercial motor vehicle or a combination of vehicles, when driving on a roadway outside a business or residence district, must not follow within 60 m of another commercial motor vehicle or a combination of vehicles, but this must not be construed to prevent one commercial motor vehicle or a combination of vehicles overtaking and passing another.

(3) The driver of a motor vehicle in a caravan or motorcade, other than a funeral procession, outside a business or residence district, must leave sufficient space between his or her vehicle and another vehicle or combination of vehicles to enable a vehicle to enter and occupy that space without danger.

The courts have also stated that there is a presumption that the rear driver is at fault, unless they can prove they are not. Defenses do, however, exist. Examples of situations where the lead driver may be found partially or totally at fault include, where:

  1. The lead driver has stopped in a place they were not permitted to.
  2. The lead driver has stopped suddenly and without sufficient reason.
  3. The lead driver has stopped in a place where their vehicle is not easily visible.
  4. The lead driver has made an unsafe lane change and “cut off” the rear driver.
  5. The lead vehicle does not make proper use of their turn signals or brake lights or has malfunctioning turn signals or brake light.

As per the above, there is a heavy onus on the rear vehicle to demonstrate why they are not at fault for a motor vehicle accident. Only in exceptional circumstances will a lead vehicle be found 100% at fault for a rear-end collision and, thus, be unable to recover damages for a personal injury case.



Whiplash leads to chronic pain and $400,000 award.

The plaintiff in this case was 67 years old and worked as a care aid and masseuse. She was injured in a motor vehicle accident after an oncoming vehicle made a left turn in front of her at an intersection. She sustained multiple physical injuries – most notably a whiplash type injury. The plaintiff later went on to develop chronic pain and psychological injury, including depression.

Of interest in this case was that the judge found the plaintiff’s ongoing chronic pain to be largely psychological and pre-existing, but reactivated by the initial genuine physical injuries. Since the plaintiff had a genuine belief that her pain was real, she was entitled to compensation for it:

“[343]     She reactivated a pre-existing major depressive disorder with psychosis which is now in partial remission. Although she suffers from chronic pain disorder, I do not accept that the pain in the plaintiff’s groin, thigh and numbness in her lower legs were caused directly by the accident; they are the result of a chronic pain disorder or somatoform disorder. Nonetheless, her perception of pain in the low back is disabling and a function of the chronic pain disorder—thus, some of her current symptoms are contributed to indirectly by the accident.”

The plaintiff was given an award of $180,000 for pain and suffering. She was also given a relatively large award for Future Cost of Care of $90,000. The judge decided that an award for Future Cost of Care “should reflect what the evidence establishes is reasonably necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s health.” The plaintiff’s award included amounts for: physiotherapy, a driving service, and further psychological treatment.

This case illustrates the complexities involved in chronic pain cases, as the source of these injuries is typically both physical and psychological. This case also shows a growing acceptance by the courts to acknowledge injuries of a purely psychological nature.

Wage Loss Claims and Pre-Existing Injuries.

Wage loss claims that involve a plaintiff with pre-existing injuries are always complicated. It is the courts role to determine what losses are attributable to the new claim and what losses would have occurred in any event.

In this recent Supreme Court of British Columbia case, the plaintiff was employed as a fisherman, with a history of working as a crew member or a skipper on seine style fishing boats. The plaintiff, at the time of their motor vehicle accident, was approximately 67 years old and had a pre-existing arthritis in his wrists and hands and diabetes. The plaintiff, after the accident, had surgeries to correct carpal tunnel syndrome, but the courts ruled that the carpal tunnel syndrome and the resulting surgeries were unrelated to the accident. The courts also ruled that the plaintiff’s arthritis would have gotten worse, even if the accident had not happened.

The plaintiff suffered a variety of soft tissue – including whiplash – injuries in a motor vehicle collision. Most notably, he suffered injury to his wrists and hands. This gave the courts the difficult task of determining what damages were related to the pre-existing hand and wrist injuries and which damages were related to injuries sustained in the motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff worked for approximately 3 more years after their accident but did not work afterwards. The plaintiff’s inability to work was the result of physical injuries and external market conditions, such as variations in fish runs.

The courts ruled that the plaintiff did have some impairment in his ability to work caused by their motor vehicle accident, but much of the plaintiff’s ongoing and previous income loss were due to his pre-existing injuries and resulting surgeries.

This case illustrates the difficulty in proving a past or future wage loss claim, but also illustrates that having pre-existing injuries is not a complete bar to recovery.